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Abstract
Albert Camus’ moral philosophy and his search for a humanistic
ethics find their basic premises in the academic dissertation that he wrote on
Christian metaphysics and Neoplatonism for the Diplo^me d’ eètudes in Algeria
in 1936.  This paper examines Camus’ ideas on Plotinus, Augustine, Pelagius,
and Gnostic thought and focuses on the Christian themes that he continued to
explore in his philosophical essays and his literary works.
Camus states in the beginning of his dissertation that its primary aim
was to distinguish the two basic lines of thought of early Christianity and later
Greek philosophy (mainly Neoplatonism), as two paradigmatic and deeply
influential modes in which human beings deal with their finitude, their
embeddedness in nature, and their ideas about their relationship with God.
Camus also sought to show how these two powerful onto-theological tradi-
tions came together through Gnosticism and Neoplatonism to form the theo-
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logical and philosophical ideas, as well as the problems, that Christianity would
create for Western civilization.
By tracing the development of philosophical and religious thought dur-
ing the period when Christianity and the Greek world first came into contact,
Camus examines the differences in worldviews between two deeply influential
intellectual currents and the values inherent in both of them.  And throughout
his life he would continue to compare and contrast Mediterranean and Euro-
pean values and their different philosophical perspectives.
The Mediterranean origins of all the key philosophers, especially in
the case of Augustine, from Camus’ own homeland, was extremely significant
for him.  In Augustine and his masterful synthesis of the Greek and Christian
speculative thought, Camus attempted to show a unification of theology and
philosophy, which created the historical and philosophical conditions upon
which Western civilization would be built, and which would come into crisis in
the modern age, particularly in the horrors of the 20th century.  It can also be
argued that early Christian metaphysics and late Hellenistic philosophy left a
positive trace in Camus’ thinking and writing, if only because of the grand
visions and poetic force of these writings.
EARLY CHRISTIANITY AND THE GREEKS
According to the young Camus, in its early stages Christianity was not
a philosophy but a faith or “a gamut of inspirations” that operated on a very
different plane than that of the Greek world.1   In Hellenism, by contrast, Man
had the primary responsibility for determining his destiny and explaining the
universe and his relationship with the gods and Nature.2  In this world knowl-
edge was the highest good and its attainment made the wise Man an equal of
God. The Good was simply defined in terms of knowledge and viewed as a
superior form of it.
In turn, all human finitude was interpreted as a lack of knowledge, and
ignorance and incomplete knowledge was seen as the real reason for human
limitations and what caused them to err.  It was those limits that defined the
human condition and Man’s tragic fate.  Most significantly, Camus highlights
the fact that Nature was the background that defined the way that the Greeks
viewed the world.  It was a cyclical world; a world that operated on an aes-
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thetic plane where the concept of beauty, structure, and order were held in the
highest esteem (as were virtues); where the body was closely connected to
Nature; and Man’s purpose was to accept and celebrate this connection.3
NATURE AND EVIL
Christianity, on the other hand, saw Nature not as something that hu-
mans must find a place in, and learn to perfect in themselves, but as something
that they must escape from.  From the Christian belief that Nature is matter
and that matter is evil, the logical conclusion is drawn, as Camus shows, that
this world is clothed in a darkness of sin and suffering.4  Christians saw it as a
world of punishment and wretchedness where humans seek some form of
salvation to release them from the bondage of misery and woe.  In this view,
the function of sin is to make humans conscious of their pride, wretchedness,
and imperfection.5  In short, Nature and the world is a lightless morass of evil
that humans are thrown into and where, more specifically, the flesh of the
body is a symbol of death and evil.
Camus devotes a large section of his dissertation to the beliefs and
teachings of some of the Gnostics, where he shows that they all shared an
obsession with the problem of evil.  He writes that “The importance of evil can
be gleaned from the writings of even the least known Gnostic.  The same is
true of all Gnostic sects.”6 This Manichean dichotomy of Good and Evil in the
world created a structure of thought and division into absolutes that separated
God and humans and made their unity an impossible task.  It also placed a
hierarchical value in the relationship of God, Humans, and Nature.  Finally, it
directed human perceptions not only toward the abstract and toward an ob-
ject that would do more than anything else to give meaning or identity to
human existence through an idea of Absolute Unity.7
The crucial moment came when the Greek mode of thinking, i.e., the
relationship between the realm of God and the human realm, based on a cycli-
cal and ordered view of Nature and a faith in the power of reason, became
more specific as it came into contact with a Judeo-Christian world that was
based on the concept of a transcendent and all-powerful God, and the atten-
dant concepts of faith, revelation, and teleology. This union was later shaped
and influenced by the Gnostics and Neoplatonism, and Camus delineates four
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stages in this evolution: the Gospel, Gnosis, Neoplatonism, and Augustinian
thought.  The first major theme around which this synthesis of Greek and
Judeo-Christian speculation revolved is the problem of death.8
DEATH AND THE INCARNATION
While the Gnostics may have been obsessed with evil, Camus writes
that early Christians were obsessed with the idea of imminent death.  This was
connected with the second coming (or parousia) of Christ, as well as the belief
in the end of the world.9  Two essential states of mind emerged from this:
pessimism and hope, the first referring to the tragic plane of death attached to
this world and the second referring to the hope and faith in God and the desire
to be transported beyond this world and beyond the realm of Nature.  One
had to choose between this world and God, from the sensible world to that of
an intangible world not marked or bounded by perceptible limits, but an infi-
nite expanse made even more distant by the apparent gap between this world
and the other.  This distance was so vast that no one could hope to bridge it,
and since man was unable to reach God, only despair was open to him.  De-
spite Man’s wretchedness and his pleas for salvation, the immeasurable dis-
tance remained filled with an unresponsive silence.10
There is no need to insist on the great significance of this kind of
analysis in view of Camus’ later writing, both philosophical and literary.  It is
clear that in the early Christian writers Camus found a duality of pessimism
and hope, a dialectic of necessary despair and illusory hope counterbalanced
by the opposite dialectic of necessary hope and fruitless despair.  Articulated
in highly speculative, theological and philosophical arguments, this dialectic
provided a fundamental mode of approaching the world that would be the
hallmark of his later philosophy of the Absurd and his very specific brand of
“existentialism.”
With the Incarnation, which Camus calls the “privileged theme” and
the center of Christian thought, the gap was bridged and the two realms were
finally connected.11  In Camus’ words: “Man being unable to rejoin God, God
comes down to man,”12 which is a reverse of the process of Plotinus’ Soul’s
ascent up the ladder to The One. In the figure of Christ, God’s will is seen
operating, and Camus cites Paul’s comment that the sole purpose of this will
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was to save mankind.  This act of will is seen as God’s second revelation.
After the first revelation in the Creation, the second revelation is Redemption.
By doing so, however, God comes into the material world through the
Word made Flesh.  Here Judeo-Christian thought provides its own solution
to the mystery of the link between God, Nature, and Man.  Through the
Incarnation, God is no longer an abstraction or numenon:  He becomes in a
sense finite.  By taking on flesh through Christ, God becomes earthly reality,
forever uniting Himself with human thought, whilst at the same time, making
this relationship more problematic.  For in connecting human thought with a
more finite and personified God through the body of Christ, the seeds of the
“death of God” are already sown, which under Nietzsche and other existential
thinkers would explicitly develop many centuries later.13
The Word became Flesh; God became Man; and Christ’s purpose
was to take on the burden of our sins.  As such, the person of Christ func-
tioned in the same way as the ancient Greek scapegoat which purified the
people and the city from its evils and then was driven out and killed in the form
of a blood sacrifice.14  In Camus’ words:
The only way to save us was to come to us, to take our
sins from us by a miracle of grace, namely Jesus, of our race,
of our blood, who acts on our behalf and has taken our place.
Dying with Him and in Him, man has paid for his sins, and the
Incarnation is at the same time the Redemption.15
Nothing, Camus writes, is as specifically Christian as this idea of the
Incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ in determining and developing the
thinking and the ideas that will come to be known as Christianity.  From this
one central tenet the evolution of its theology and philosophy develops through
the dialectic that it will create through years of opposing thoughts and heresies
and the works of the apologists, eventually pushing it toward the structure of
orthodoxy or dogma that will result in the construction of an institution of
power and influence.16
Camus’ emphasis on the body, on sensual experience as a locus where
the world is revealed in its truth and the absurd is vanquished, is somehow the
heir to this highly ambiguous Christian teaching of God made flesh.  Early
Christian speculation thus created the conditions for the emergence of institu-
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tions that modernity and postmodernity would strive to dismantle, but also
captured, in theological and metaphysical garments, the sacred value of sen-
suous experience and bodily interaction with the world.  In a sense, one might
say that Camus’ work attempts to write a dechristianized version of the theo-
ries of the Incarnation and the Redemption.
PHILOSOPHY, KNOWLEDGE, AND FAITH
Against the Greek ideas of knowledge and truth, as in principle attain-
able through philosophical speculation, stood the Christian ideas that knowl-
edge is faith and that Man sinned or did evil not out of a lack of knowledge or
ignorance, but by the very nature of existing.17  Only faith was necessary for
salvation.  Indeed, the importance of evil or sin is probably even more deci-
sive between these two systems than those of the Incarnation or Redemption,
because it is sin and guilt that made the Incarnation and Redemption neces-
sary.18
The rational knowledge of the Greeks and the religious faith of the
Christians were two competing epistemologies that not only had to do with
the limits of knowledge, but also the limits of the human will and the idea of sin,
as the early heresies illustrate.  For example, Camus quotes Clement as saying
that “Greek philosophy is merely a produce of human intelligence: it does not
teach the truth”, and Camus relates that the opinions of the Christians in Alex-
andria was that “Faith is sufficient for man and all else is literature.”19
The opposition of reason and faith or Greek philosophy and Chris-
tianity reached its climax in works of Pagan philosophers like Celsus and
Porphyry, who criticized the beliefs of Christianity and whose intellectual re-
volt was met with a forceful response from the early Church by Origen in his
Against Celsus, and to a lesser degree by Macarius Magnes in his Apocriticus.
As R. Joseph Hoffman has shown:
The criticism of Christianity for its lack of a coherent
philosophical system--a criticism which cannot easily be
separated from the sociomoral attacks on the sort of people
who found the new religion appealing-becomes a fixture of
pagan polemical writing from the mid-second century onward.
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Celsus himself, in a famous passage, alleges that most
Christians ‘do not want to give or receive a reason for what
they believe’ but rather win  converts by telling them “not to
ask questions but to have faith”.20
It is primarily the opposition between these ideas of philosophical
logic and faith that Neoplatonism sought to reconcile.  In any case, this is how
Camus viewed Neoplatonism, and the reason why it was significant to him
early on.  For him, Neoplatonism was “a constant effort to reconcile contra-
dictory ideas with the help of a principle of participation, a principle which has
a place solely in a logic divorced from space and time”.21  These contrasting
ideas of intellect and faith created a dialectic from Plotinus to Saint Augustine,
or as Camus calls it a “dialogue between heart and reason”, where he says the
truths of this dialectic could only be expressed in images. These images used
by Plotinus and others served to “mould the intelligibles into a shape that can
be grasped by the senses, to restore to intuition what belonged to Reason”.22
In other words, Plotinus served as a mediator by joining the intellect with
artistic images that could be understood on the sensible level of parables.  This
explains Camus’ comment that these two systems of thought met “on the plane
of philosophy”.23
Heart and reason and religious and philosophical thinking were brought
together to create new frames of reference that helped to solve the problems
that were raised by applying logic and doctrinal questions to a system of faith.
Neoplatonism used the rational structures of Greek philosophy to construct
the fundamental premises as well as the dialectic that created the basic truths
of Christianity, and nowhere was this seen more clearly than in the writing of
Saint Augustine, who borrowed many of his ideas from Plato, Plotinus, and
Porphyry.
SAINT AUGUSTINE
Camus wrote of Augustine that his philosophy assimilated “all the un-
certainties and vicissitudes of Christian thought”.24  While Augustine was a
follower of Manichaeism, (which Camus calls a mere continuation of Gnosti-
cism, primarily because of its focus on evil and death), it was the writings of
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Saint Ambrose and the Neoplatonists that led to his conversion, as Augustine
relates in his Confessions.25
Camus claims that the problem of evil obsessed Augustine, and while
he was “Greek” in his need for rational coherence, Augustine was plagued
with anxieties.  It is this conflict between the mind and emotions that led him
away from Manichaeism in search of other forms of truth as he wrestled with
the carnal and the spiritual.26  Camus writes that “it seemed to him above all
that the solution was not to be found in knowledge, that the resolution of his
doubts and of his distaste for the flesh did not lie in intellectual escape but in
the total acknowledgement of his depravity and wretchedness”.27  In his search
for faith and truth, Augustine ended up transforming Neoplatonism into Chris-
tianity.28
According to Camus, the greatest contribution of Plotinus to
Augustine’s thinking was the “doctrine of the Word as mediator” and “a solu-
tion to the problem of evil”, while the most important ideas that Augustine
sought in Neoplatonism were Christ, the Incarnation, and the Trinity.29  It is on
this basis that Augustine sought to unite Greek and Christian thought.  If we list
the themes that occupied most of Augustine’s writing, we see once again how
Camus’ early encounter with Christian metaphysics provided him with a lan-
guage to articulate his core beliefs and experiences.  The basic Augustinian
themes were: Happiness, Evil, Sin, Grace, Freedom, and Human Will.30
The Neoplatonists taught that evil was a privation, not a reality in itself
and while Augustine agreed, according to Camus, he stated that there were
two kinds of evil: natural and moral evil.31  While natural evil results from the
human condition or the wretched state and the tragedy of Man’s “fall” into
Nature and matter, moral evil was sin as a direct result of the human will.  Sin
came from our being given free will by God, but this was tainted by the ill use
we make of it.32  Camus adds that “we have fallen so far that the proper
exercise of free will is invariably to be traced to God alone”, which reinforces
the idea that we, or our Soul, have fallen so far into matter and darkness that
humans, basically, only have the will to sin.33  In that state, humans have for-
feited their free will and are in bondage, slaves to evil and matter, which ex-
plains their wretchedness.  Once again, it is extremely tempting to see in such
speculation an anticipation of Camus’ own anxieties, and to make the point
that Camus will provide a dechristianized, secular version in his novels and
plays of this deep feeling of “falling” and of Man’s unhappy state.
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      Unlike the Greek idea of virtue, Augustine believed that virtue without
God is useless and beyond human capacity. God bestows grace, and on that
basis virtue can be achieved.  This is opposed to Plotinus’ idea in The Enne-
ads that the Soul turns toward virtue and that an ascent to The Good is achievable
by contemplation and self-reflection.34  With Augustine, morality and values
find their primary source in God rather than humans.  As Camus remarks, this
makes the virtues of the pagans useless, since for the Christian these virtues
can become faults and even sins, such as pride.  It is not the pagan idea of
virtues seen as a Good or a form of excellence through which the powers of
human life and human potentials can be extolled, as in Plato and Aristotle, but
the idea that Man’s first duty is not to himself, but to God.  For the Christian it
is faith, not virtue, that is the beginning of grace.  Believing in God is the first
step in submitting to that grace.35
In speaking of Augustine’s ideas of God and freedom, Camus then
remarks that:
The grace of God is, in this context, totally arbitrary:  man
should simply put his trust in God.  How then can one speak
of Man’s freedom? Precisely because our sole freedom is the
Freedom to do wrong.  Saint Augustine’s final avowal on this
question, vital for the Christian, is one of ignorance.  God’s
will remains intact.36
This question of God’s will and human freedom is most clearly seen in
The Plague in the sermon of Father Paneloux where he made it clear that
“this plague came from God, for the punishment of their sins”,37 and that “since
it was God’s will, we, too, should will it”.38
AUGUSTINE AND PELAGIUS
For Camus, Pelagius’ substantial discussion of free will, choice, and
sin was highly instrumental in shaping Augustine’s philosophy.39  Pelagius, like
the later existentialists, believed that Man was created free; that he is able to
choose between doing Good or Evil; and that this free will is a freedom or
emancipation from God.40 Of course the logical conclusion that one could
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make from this statement would be that if a) Humans can choose, b) They can
avoid sin, and therefore, c) Humans can be free from sin.  This logical conclu-
sion would render the Christian idea of original sin meaningless and would
negate the need for grace, salvation, and ultimately the Incarnation.  This is the
reason behind the Pelagian heresy and Augustine’s opposition to it.  Pelagius’
argument was that Adam was born mortal; his sin and the Fall were not our
mistake; and therefore, his bad example should not condemn other humans.
For Pelagius, grace was not something that could be given because creation
itself was already a grace.41
For the young Camus, these theological disputes hide important truths
about Man’s freedom, God, and the reality of free will.  He mentions the
Council of Carthage (29 April 418 A.D.), where the teachings of Pelagius
were attacked by the Church: “In general, this teaching puts its trust in man
and scorns explanations which refer to the will of God.  It is also an act of faith
in the nature and independence of man”.  And Camus adds: “This thesis then,
was above all a declaration of man’s independence of God and a denial of that
persistent need of the creator that is at the basis of the Christian religion”.42
What Camus could find in these old debates was already the kind of philo-
sophical point made by later materialists and, of course, 20th century existen-
tialists.  Needless to say, questioning the “need for a creator” would also
become one of his main intellectual endeavors.
     Augustine countered Pelagius’ teaching by saying that Adam was immor-
tal; that he originally had the ability not to sin; that he already had a form of
grace; and that he was free.  This all changed, however, when Adam de-
stroyed this happy state in Eden by committing the original sin.43  Our corrupt
nature stems from this and since our human nature is corrupted, without bap-
tism and God’s grace, we are damned.  In essence, as a result of this we have
no freedom not to sin.  Humans are incapable of not sinning and we have no
choice in this.  We carry the original sin of Adam, and subsequently, are des-
tined for Hell and Damnation unless we turn to God for salvation.  Predestina-
tion is our fate and our only choice of history, since moral values exist a priori,
and what limited freedom and actions we may have only exist within this linear
movement of Time.44
With this idea of predestination and of Man’s fate, salvation and grace
become even more important, and Camus says that we depend on this idea of
grace for three things: 1) “to protect us from our fallen nature”, 2) “to believe
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in the truths of the supernatural order”, and 3) “to enable us to act in accor-
dance with these truths”.45  We do have the freedom to reject or accept these
graces, but as he puts it, our freedom is defined by this context and the con-
cept of God, and freedom exists only within this context.  What is most fasci-
nating about his rendering of Augustine’s rejoinders to the Pelagian heresy is
that, despite the fact that the latter already articulates the basic tenets of the
existentialist position, Augustine continues to represent a positive reference
and influence for him.  It is as though the philosophical power and rhetorical
mastery of his demonstrations contained some truth, beyond the untenability
of the dogmas he defends.  The relevance of the Augustinian idea of Man’s
“fall” needs to be rescued, as it were, from its theological clothes and rewrit-
ten in the prose of the modern novel.  Meursault and the penitent Jean-Baptiste
Clamence of The Fall could be seen as later, secularized incarnations of Au-
gustinian Man.
THE TRINITY AND THE INCARNATION
In the last part of his dissertation, Camus focuses on Augustine’s idea
of the Word Made Flesh and the concept of the Trinity.  Whereas in Plotinus
“the pure soul dwells with the intelligibles” in the realm of Intelligible Forms,
and he stresses the gap or the distance that exists between The One and the
Intellect,46 for Augustine the ideas (Plato’s Ideal Forms) are like the first forms,
which are eternal and unchangeable (and therefore true or absolutes).  These
ideas represent God or at the very least the divine presence in them.47  Augus-
tine thus places the emphasis on God, from which all things emanate, unlike
Plotinus, who focuses on the Soul and the separation that exists between the
three hypostases.  Augustine’s focus on God is represented most clearly in the
Trinity of God, Man, and Spirit, which rather than a hierarchy, forms a unity,
where each part contains the others.  By doing so, Augustine defines and
closes the distance that separates these ideas or realms in Plotinus.48
Camus remarks that The Word in Augustine is, however, not the In-
tellect of Neoplatonism and of Plotinus.  For Augustine the Word was made
flesh in the Incarnation of Christ, in what amounts to God taking on human
form in the miracle of the Incarnation.49  Through the Word becoming Flesh,
humans would now be able to participate in God on earth, not as something
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that occurs only after death through the Soul’s conversion and its return to a
lost homeland.  Christianity bridged the gap and the distance of silence that
had characterized Man’s relationship to God, thereby confirming that this sepa-
ration was finally closed.  As a result, one could say that Faith and Reason
were also brought closer together, creating boundaries of thought that allowed
the necessary elements for the beginning of Christian dogma.50
It is important to follow Camus’ patient reconstruction of these dog-
mas, as it shows the extent to which he sought to salvage the figure of Augus-
tine for his role in bringing together the best of Christian and Greek metaphys-
ics through the synthesis of the philosophical frameworks of Plato, Plotinus,
and the Gnostics, and through his understanding of the Incarnation and the
Trinity.  In Camus’ words:
Saint Augustine ends where Plotinus’ conversion
culminates.  They both pursue the same conclusion, but while
their paths sometimes overlap, they are different nonetheless.
Augustine asserts at every step that philosophy is not enough.
The sole intelligent reason is that which is enlightened by faith.51
Again, Camus’ paradoxical attraction to the Father of the Church is
incontrovertibly represented here.  What could easily appear as a dogmatic
rejection of Man’s true position in the world (free but finite) is interpreted by
Camus in explicitly positive terms.  Later on, just as for Augustine, philosophy
won’t “be enough” for Camus either.  He will replace the trust in faith with a
faith in sensual experience, engagement, and creation.  However, he will al-
ways retain from Augustine the gesture of distrusting an overly rationalistic
approach in dealing with the finitude of human existence.
Augustine’s main contribution to Christianity was thus to “make Greek
reason more supple and to fuse it with the Christian edifice, but in a sphere in
which it can do no harm”,52 By contrast, the role of Neoplatonism was to
“support this softening of Reason, to lure Socratic logic to religious specula-
tions and so to transmit this tool, already fashioned, to the Fathers of the
Christian Church”.53
Camus quotes Augustine as saying, “If you cannot understand, believe so
that you may understand.  Faith comes first, understanding follows.  Therefore do
not seek to understand, but believe so that you may understand”.54  Reason must
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be humble and pliant and in a subordinate position to Faith, and Camus writes that
Faith in Augustine consists of two things: 1) the belief in supernatural truths, and 2)
“man’s humble abandonment to the grace of God”.55  Knowledge does not begin
with reason, but with faith.  The role of dogma is to give knowledge and certainty
to that faith; critical reasoning is not important, but rather humility and submission.
According to Camus, the Word or Logos that was brought into Christianity from
Neoplatonism was not just Intellect, but God, and therefore Intellect is no longer
just an effusion or emanation as in Plotinus, but a creation of God.56  The Word,
Dogma, and Truth become joined into a Logos, and God can now communicate
with his creation.
Camus concludes his dissertation by remarking that some speak of a
Hellenization of early Christianity and agrees that, as regards morality, this is a
correct statement.  However, as has just been shown, this is not the final truth
of the matter.  More significantly, Camus felt that Christian morality cannot be
taught, because it is an “interior ascesis which serves to ratify a faith”.57  Again
we find here Camus’ paradoxical attraction to a form of moral teaching that
escapes the strictures of rationalism and goes beyond all of his disagreements
about content.  Rather than a Hellenization of Christianity then, we should
speak, he says approvingly, of the Christianization of a decadent Hellenism.58
According to Camus, Nietzsche’s thesis was that Greece was a culture of
“pessimism, insensible and tragic”, while Christianity was a renaissance com-
pared to “Socratism and its serenity”.59  Christian Man replaced the Greek
one.  Despite Camus’ sympathy for the Greek spirit, however, he finds himself
attracted to the Christian translation of Greek speculation as carried out in
most exemplary fashion by Augustine.
In the final paragraph, Camus says that by the time of Augustine’s
death, Christianity had become a philosophy and that it was “sufficiently armed”
to resist attacks against its basic tenets.60  By this time the basic foundations of
Christian thought had been constructed through the merging of Christian the-
ology and Greek philosophy; through the suppression of the main heresies;
and through the establishment of its basic themes and doctrines.61  The last
sentence of his dissertation reads:
For many years now it has remained the only hope and
the only real shield against the misfortune of the Western world.
In this way Christianity won its catholicity.62
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This statement is highly significant in the context of Camus’ philo-
sophical thought.  For at first glance the treatment in Camus’ later writing of
such themes as the death of God; the place of Man in the world; his relation-
ship to Nature; the importance of the Body; the belief in Immortality; the
problems of Evil, Sin, and Suffering; the need for Salvation; the powers of
Reason and Knowledge; the nostalgia for Faith; the limits of Free Will, Free-
dom, and Human Happiness-appears as if it stands in sharp contrast and
stark opposition to the Christianity that he presented in his dissertation.  How-
ever, it should also, hopefully, be clear by now that the dissertation and the
academic engagement with Christian metaphysics helped Camus gain invalu-
able insights into the continuing depth and magnitude of these early ideas, as
they had engaged the minds of the early philosophers and theologians.  What
is most important is that Camus used these Neoplatonist and Christian themes
to illuminate the travails of the 20th century and to show how these fundamen-
tal themes were still crucially relevant to the problems of human morality and
moral philosophy.
As Camus develops his thinking on the absurd, nihilism, the human
condition, and the dangers and necessity of revolt, what appears is a philoso-
phy that reflects a continuous dialogue questioning, yet constantly finding in-
spiration from, the basic premises and early formations of Christian thought
and natural law.  In his dissertation, Camus learned the full significance of
these notions despite his rejection of the dogmas.  Camus’ materialist and
“pagan” viewpoints, and his “Greek” affinities, led him to emphasize the con-
crete realities of human morality, ethics, happiness, justice, and social exist-
ence, where Man is placed at the center of importance rather than the abso-
lutes and ideologies of religious and political systems.  However, Camus’ Man
is also, in some ways, a “detranscendentalized” version of the fallen Augustin-
ian Man.
The literary works and the philosophical essays of Camus that follow
his dissertation all reflect the Christian influences outlined in this work.  These
early Christian ways of perceiving and identifying the problems of human ex-
istence were translated into the main problems that would shape his own philo-
sophical thought, i.e., the realities of human existence, Man’s need for reli-
gious certainties and political absolutes, and the problems of moral and politi-
cal action.  When one examines Camus’ opposition to the Christian worldview
and its philosophy, we are better able to understand the influences that shaped
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his religious and political thinking; his moral philosophy; where this dialogue
with Christianity led him in his search for meaning and value; and his vision of
the tragic nature of human existence.
J. Larson teaches philosophy at Waseda Unversity and lectures at
Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan.  He can be contacted at: jlarson@gol.com.
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of being tied to Godot in Act I of Waiting for Godot.
14For a thorough discussion of the idea of the scapegoat and Christ as the
sacrificial Lamb of God, see Ren
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comments: “Yet the crowd wins out; nothing is more important than this victory, noth-
ing more significant for the revelation of the mechanism that selects a victim” 106-107.
15Op. cit., 102.
16Ibid., 103.  Two important early pagan writings against Christianity were
Celsus’ On the True Doctrine, which was countered by Origen in his Contra Celsum,
and Porphyry’s Against the Christians, which was countered by several Christian writ-
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and his Porphyry’s Against the Christians: The Literary Remains (New York:  Prometheus
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under Constantine.
17This whole problem of knowledge and truth is one that pits the two realms of
the philosophical and the religious and the belief that only the Gods are omniscient.
According to Alcmaeon, “Gods possess clear knowledge of matters invisible”. Early
Greek Philosophy (London:  Penguin Books, 2001) 36.  As Heraclitus said, “For human
ways have no insights, divine ways have”. 67.
18While religion and the belief in God allow for the possibility of absolution and
redemption, in a world without God the problem of guilt and absolution become intrac-
table.  This is the subject that Dostoevsky struggled with in Crime and Punishment and
The Brothers Karamazov, and that Camus focused on in The Fall.  For existential man
and the philosophy of existentialism where God is absent, the question of how Man gets
rid of his guilt and the judgment of others has no solution.
19Op. cit., 107.
20See R. Joseph Hoffman’s Celsus: On the True Doctrine 27.
21Op. cit.,139.
22Ibid., 139.  This idea reflects Pascal’s comment that “the heart has a reason
that the reason knows not of”.  Pascal is mentioned at the beginning (100) and at the end
of Camus’ dissertation 152.
23Ibid., 139.
24Ibid., 142.
25Ibid., 142.  In his Confessions (London: Penguin, 1961), Augustine relates
that he was an adherent of the Manicheans for nine years but that his encounter with
Faustus and his apparent shortcomings led to a disenchantment.  In Book V, Augustine
talks about “The keen interest which I had had in Manichean doctrines was checked by
this experience, and my confidence in the other teachers of the sect was further dimin-
ished when I saw that Faustus, of whom they spoke so much, was obviously unable to
settle the numerous problems which troubled me” 99.  He then goes on to explain the
influence of Ambrose and his eventual preference for Catholic teaching (116).
26Ibid., 142.  Camus’ notebooks are filled with passages reminiscent of
Augustine’s struggle with the carnal and the spiritual and the need for chastity In
Notebook 1935-1951, he writes: “It is legitimate to glory in the diversity and quantity of
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impulses __ only if one is completely disinterested in the object of one’s desires.  There
is also the leap into material things-and many men who glory in the senses do so only
because they are slaves to them.  Here, too, they embrace the vulture which is eating
them away.  Hence the absolute necessity to have gone through the experience of
chastity, for example, and to have been ruthless with oneself.  Before any deliberately
thought-out enterprise aimed at glorifying the world of immediate experience, a moment’s
asceticism in everything” 162.
27Ibid., 142.
28Ibid., 142.
29Ibid., 143.  Celsus accuses the Christians of worshipping a man rather than a
god (the heresy of Arianism), which precludes them from being called monotheists
(116).  Hoffman makes the statement  in the Notes that “Such attacks as these stand
behind later philosophical defenses of the unity of the godhead, and issue finally in the
credal definitions of the fourth century” (Note 197) 142.  By “unity of the godhead”,
Hoffman is referring to the concept of the Trinity, which was codified at the Council of
Nicaea in 325 A.D.  Camus discusses the conflict over Christ’s divinity between Arius
and Athanasius and the role of the Neoplatonists in solving this problem: “The Nicene
Creed (325 A.D.) states the principle of consubstantiality and opposes the begotten
Christ to the created Jesus of Arius...” 140.
30Ibid., 143. Olivier Todd in Albert Camus: A Life. (New York: Carroll & Graf,
1997), relates the following story in his biography, which is particularly telling: when a
Dominican priest told Camus that he had not found grace, Camus replied: “I am your
Augustine before his conversion.  I am debating the problem of evil and I'm not getting
past it” 230.
31Ibid., 144.
32Ibid., 144.
33Ibid., 144.  Camus quotes Augustine for whom “Man’s sole possession is
deceit and sin” 100.
34See the section on virtues in Plotinus’ The Enneads (London:  Penguin, 1991)
on pages 15-23, and the section on conversion on pages 338-229.
35Ibid., 144.  This contrast between Christian faith and Greek virtues, between
an absolute God and the importance of human character runs through the Notebooks
and shapes Camus’ moral reflections.  For instance, Camus makes the statement in
Carnets III that “Character is not virtue which we have: it is acquired” 15.  Human
character and action are bounded by vices and virtues and their extremes.  This is
reflected in Camus’ comments in Notebooks 1935-1951: “an extreme virtue that con-
sists in killing one’s passions.  A deeper virtue that consists in balancing them” 187;
“There are some temptations which are so strong that they must be virtues” 134; and in
Notebooks 1942-1951 “All great virtues have an absurd aspect” 27.
36Ibid., 144-145. Compare this idea to Pascal’s Wager and Kierkegaard’s Leap of
Faith on putting your faith in God.  This idea is also connected to predestination and the
teleological belief in history as God’s design or will, which is a major tenet in divine
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37Camus, The Plague 83.  It is interesting to note that in the novel, Father
Paneloux is conducting research on St. Augustine and the African Church.  See page 78.
38Camus 184.
39Op. cit., 145.  According to the online Catholic Encyclopedia, Pelagius “de-
nied the primitive state in paradise and original sin..., insisted on the naturalness of
concupiscence and the death of the body, and ascribed the actual existence and univer-
sality of sin to the bad example which Adam set by his first sin.  As all of his ideas were
chiefly rooted in the old, pagan philosophy, especially in the popular system of the
Stoics, rather than in Christianity, he regarded the moral strength of man’s will (liberum
arbitrium), when steeled by asceticism, as sufficient in itself to desire and attain the
loftiest ideal of virtue” 2. The article also discusses Pelagius’ friendship with Caelestius;
Caelestius’ six theses, which were deemed heretical and reflected the main ideas of
Pelagianism; Augustine’s response; and the attempts by the Church to counter Pelagius’
teachings, which culminated in the Council of Carthage in 418 A.D. (5) See
www.newadvent/org/cathen/11604.html
40Ibid., 145.
41Ibid., 145.
42Ibid., 145.
43Ibid., 146.  The logic here is that human reason, while given by God, is imper-
fect and that it can be used incorrectly, resulting in both sin and the need for faith.
44Ibid., 146.  The debates about Predestination between Dr. Rieux and Father
Paneloux constitute one of the main themes in The Plague.
45Ibid., 146.
46Ibid., 147.
47Ibid., 147.
48 The notion of the Trinity and Christ’s divinity were defined and codified at
the Council of Nicaea (325 A.D.), presided over by Constantine, and at the second, third,
and fourth councils held at Constantinople (381 A.D.), Ephesus (431 A.D.), and Chalcedon
(451 A.D.). The first three councils also dealt with the heresies of Arius, Macedonius,
and Pelagius.  For an account of these councils, see The Catholic Encyclopedia online
at (www.newadvent.org/cathen).
49Op. cit., 148.
50In contrast to the emanations of the hypostases outlined in Plotinus, which
were understood as manifestations of light and the soul descending into matter, Logos
or the Word of God in Christianity was transmitted first through the law of Moses and
then took on flesh in the Incarnation of Christ.  This fundamental difference in the
conception of “manifestation” was at the heart of the philosophical and theological
disputes between the pagan philosophers and the early Christians. These debates
directly informed the dogmas of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ.  It is important to
keep this historical-philosophical background in view given the importance of both
these elements in Camus’ writing and thinking.  In rediscovering these old debates,
Camus saw at play gigantic struggles, waged simultaneously in thought and politics,
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over the exact definition of the tragic paradigm.  For the section on the three hypostases,
see Plotinus’ The Enneads on pages 347-360.
51Op. cit., 149.
52Ibid., 149-150.
53Ibid., 149.
54Ibid., 149.
55Ibid., 149.
56Ibid., 151.
57 Ibid., 151.  While Camus may make the statement that Christian morality
cannot be taught, it is quite clear that the Church and governments have tried to do just
that, and in many ways, the fate of Meursault in The Outsider reflects the consequences
when someone refuses to accept that morality.
58Ibid., 126.
59Ibid., 152.  See this other amazing passage in The Birth of Tragedy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), which speaks directly to Camus’ Nietzschean
interpretation of the differences between Neoplatonism to Christian metaphysics: “If
one can still speak of ‘Greek serenity’, then only as the cheerfulness of slaves who know
no graver responsibility, no higher ambition, nothing in the past or future of higher
value than the present.  This appearance of ‘Greek cheerfulness’ was what so outraged
profound and fierce natures in the first four centuries of Christianity. It seemed to them
that his womanish flight from all that was grave and frightening, this cowardly content-
ment with comfortable pleasure, was not simply despicable, but was the true anti-Chris-
tian attitude of mind” 56-7.  In his Introduction to Nietzsche’s work, Raymond Geuss
comments that the key point for Nietzsche was affirmation, and “since both Schopenhauer
and Christianity agree that this world is not to be affirmed, they are really instances of
the same kind of weakness, and the difference in their metaphysical views (that the
Christian thinks the underlying reality of the world, God, is to be affirmed while
Schopenhauer thinks this underlying reality, the Will, is to be negated) is irrelevant”
(xxvii).  Such opposition between Nietzschean affirmation and Christian negation of the
world finds its way most famously in the last chapter of Camus’ The Outsider in the
confrontation between the Priest and Meursault.
60Ibid., 152.  Hoffman argues that “The moral critiques of Christianity antedate
the philosophical assaults of writers like Celsus for an obvious reason:  the Christianity
of the first century had yet to develop an assailable system of belief or fixed canon of
writings from which such beliefs could be deduced.  It is only as doctrine begins to
supplant apocalyptic enthusiasm and the practices associated with it that the focus of
pagan writers shifts from what Christians do to what they teach...” Celsus 24.
61With the Emperor Constantine, this theology and philosophy would be united
with political power, giving Christianity military, legal, and spiritual authority.
62Ibid., 152.
74  Prajna Vihara- -~
References
Augustine, Saint, Confessions.  London:  Penguin, 1961.
Barmes, Jonathan,  Early Greek Philosophy.  London: Penguin, 1987.
Camus, Albert.  Carnets III:  Mars 1951-December 1959.  Paris:  Gallimard,
1989.
Camus, Albert.  Notebooks: 1935-1951.  New York:  Marlowe, 1963.
Camus, Albert.  Notebooks: 1942-1951.  New York:  Harcourt Brace, 1965.
Camus, Albert.  The Plague.  London:  Penguin, 1948.
Girard, Reneè.  The Scapegoat.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986.
Hoffman, R. Joseph,  Celsus On the True Doctrine:  A Discourse Against
the Christians.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987.
Hoffman, R. Joseph.  Porphyry’s Against the Christians: The Literary
Remains.  New York:  Prometheus, 1994.
King, Karen L.  What is Gnosticism?  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press,
2003.
Macbride, Joseph, Albert Camus: Philosopher and Litterateur. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth of Tragedy.  Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
“Pelagius”, Catholic Encyclopedia. http://newadvent/org/cathen/11604.html.
Plotinus, The Enneads.  London: Penguin, 1991.
Todd, Olivier, Albert Camus: A Life.  New York: Carroll & Graf, 1997.
J. Larson  75
'
